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We address criticism of the Letter “Exposed-Key Weakness of αη” in the Comment by Nair and
Yuen. The Comment claims that the Letter does not show insecurity of αη because our approxima-
tion for the eavesdropper’s entropy on the encrypted key is invalid. We present simulations which
show that, on the contrary, our estimate is in close agreement with numerical calculations of the
actual entropy over the applicable domain. We additionally discuss some ways in which our views
on security requirements differ from the views given in the Comment.
The Comment by Nair and Yuen [1] claims to refute
statements made in our Letter “Exposed-Key Weakness
of αη” [2]. The main dispute concerns the validity of an
approximation used in the derivation of our estimate for
the eavesdropper’s entropy on the encryption key. In this
Reply, we present simulations supporting the validity of
our estimate and provide a more detailed explanation of
the reasoning underlying our approximation. We then
give various applications of our estimate in quantifying
security, as well as discuss some ways in which we differ
from the authors of the Comment with regard to security
requirements.
First, let us reiterate the claims made in the origi-
nal Letter which are nominally disputed. We assume an
αη system using M coherent states, initialized with L-
bit seed key K, with measurement error described by a
gaussian distribution with standard deviation σ. In our
Letter, we state that even if an eavesdropper Eve starts
with zero information on both the key and the message
under transmission (i.e. a ciphertext only attack),
We therefore take U . . . as an upper bound on
Eve’s information on K per measured symbol.
We expect Eve’s information to grow linearly
with the number of symbols. . . This approx-
imation will of course break down when the
Eve’s entropy on K is low, such that her en-
tropy on the key will only asymptotically ap-
proach zero as the number of symbols goes to
infinity. . . Eve’s entropy on the key will tran-
sition from linear decline to asymptotic de-
cay after measuring approximately n0 = L/U
symbols. . .
where we derived U to be
U ≈ log( M
σ
√
2pie
)− 1. (1)
This can be summarized as
HE(K) ≥ L−QU, (2)
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HE(K) ≈ L−QU for Q n0 = L/U, (3)
where Q is the number of encoded bits sent, and
lim
Q→∞
HE(K) = 0, (4)
where HE(K) is Eve’s entropy on the key.
The authors of the Comment argue that (3) can be
replaced with
HE(K) = L−QU for Q ≤ ndep (5)
HE(K) ≥ L−QU for Q > ndep, (6)
where ndep is the number of statistically independent
strings {kq} generated by the pseudo-random number
generator (PRNG), and is dependent on which PRNG
is used; an upper bound for ndep is given in the Com-
ment of ndep ≤ |K|/ log2M/2. We do not disagree with
(5,6).
However, the Comment additionally claims that for
ndep < Q  n0, the left and right hand sides of (6)
may be sufficiently far apart such that the approximation
(3) is not valid. To investigate this claim, we performed
Monte Carlo simulations of the αη system. For each sim-
ulation, a seed key and message were chosen from a uni-
form distribution. The running key was generated from
the seed key using an L-bit linear feedback shift register
(LFSR) as the PRNG. Eve’s measurements were simu-
lated by adding a gaussian distributed random variable
to the phase angle of each symbol sent. We calculated the
probability that Eve assigns to each seed key by starting
with a uniform probability and using the measurement
result after each transmitted symbol to update the prob-
abilities.
Over this ensemble, with randomly chosen seed, mes-
sage, and measurement noise, we computed the average
entropy that Eve has on the seed key, and the aver-
age probability that she assigns to the correct seed key,
PE(K) (see Figure 1). The parameters used in the calcu-
lation are L = 13, M = 256, σ = 16, and the averaging
was performed over 104 simulations. For comparison, our
estimate (3) is also plotted.
As can be seen from Fig. 1, our estimate is quite accu-
rate over the specified domain. Note that with these sim-
ulation parameters, ndep < 2; that is, the second running
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FIG. 1: Circles () on the left axis denote the expectation of
Eve’s entropy on the key, HE(K), as a function of the number
of encoded bits sent, Q. Squares ( ) on the right axis indicate
PE(K) the average probability that Eve assigns to the correct
value of the key. The line is the estimate (3) calculated in the
Letter. The PRNG is a 13-bit LFSR, the number of possible
symbols for each transmission is M = 256, and the gaussian
measurement noise has standard deviation σ = 16. Averaging
was performed over 104 Monte-Carlo simulations.
key is not statistically independent of the first. How-
ever, it can be seen that the amount of information that
Eve gains from each symbol is nearly the same for the
first several symbols. Indeed, even when the entropy is
less than the size of the running key, our estimate is still
valid. The actual entropy does not significantly deviate
from our estimate until the entropy is quite low.
This can be understood by re-visiting the derivation
in the Letter. The derivation does not depend on an
analogy to Shannon’s random cipher, as the Comment
supposes, and additionally is completely independent of
the contents of the plaintext. It instead results from a
consideration of the probabilities that Eve assigns to the
keys after each measurement.
Eve begins with no information on the key. Therefore,
she assigns the same probability to all possible values.
Upon making a measurement, however, she can update
these probabilities according to Bayes’ rule, which states
that the probability of each key should be multiplied by
the probability that that key would generate the observed
measurement (divided by a normalization factor). Thus
seed keys which generate running keys close (on the half-
circle) to the observed symbol will have their probabil-
ities increased, while seed keys which generate distant
running keys will have their probabilities lowered. The
information that Eve gains is related to the change in the
probabilities she assigns to the symbols before and after
the measurement.
The estimate (3) is based on the approximation that
just prior to each measurement, Eve’s probabilities are,
on average, nearly uniform across the possible symbol
values, and assumes a well-behaved PRNG. We may con-
sider the PRNG as an ordered list of Q maps from the
space of seed keys {0, . . . 2L − 1} to the space of run-
ning keys {0, . . .M −1}. We assume that the PRNG will
be a typical member of the set of all lists of maps, and
therefore that the distribution of running keys (on ensem-
bles with varying seed key and iteration number) will be
nearly uniform. In other words, though the PRNG is en-
tirely deterministic, its ensemble distributions will mimic
those of a true random number generator with uniform
probabilities. In practice, even an LFSR, which is gener-
ally considered a poor PRNG, appears to be sufficiently
well-distributed for our purposes.
Let us consider a simple case in order to better un-
derstand why this estimate works. Take the case where
the measurement noise is uniformly distributed over one
quarter of the phase circle. The determination of the
half-circle encodes the data. The knowledge of the quar-
ter circle may be used to reject, after each measurement,
the possibility of one half of the possible running keys.
Approximately one half of the seed keys will generate
one of the running keys that can be ruled out. Therefore
those seed keys can be eliminated. Since the running
keys for different seeds are not correlated, we are not
throwing out the exact same set of seed keys over and
over; after each measurement, we are throwing out one
half of the seed keys, selected in a uniform fashion. At
any step, about as many remaining seed keys generate
running keys within the correct quadrant as outside of
it; thus we can eliminate approximately half of the re-
maining keys after each measurement. This is true even
when Q > ndep; that is, statistical independence is not
required.
This estimate does not break down until the estimated
number of remaining seed keys is of order one. It breaks
down because there remains the possibility that there will
be another seed key which will generate running keys
which, like the running keys generated by the correct
seed key, are all in the same quadrant as the measure-
ments. The probability that this is true for any given
false seed key, however, falls exponentially with the num-
ber of transmission events. This “probability” involves
both the truly random measurement noise and the fre-
quency of occurrence of events in an ensemble generated
by the deterministic PRNG.
In summation, the estimate (3) is based on an approxi-
mation which continues to hold until Eve’s entropy is low
(of order one bit) or, equivalently, the probability she as-
signs to the correct key is high (of order one). It does not
rely on the statistical independence of the running keys.
In the region about n0, the behavior of the entropy
function becomes more complicated. At the present time,
we do not have a precise analytic form for the entropy
3in this region, and so we are limited to numerical simu-
lations such as those shown above. The authors of the
Comment claim that no statements about the insecurity
of the system may be made until a precise expression,
applicable over the entire domain Q ∈ [0,∞), is found
for the probability that Eve assigns to the correct seed
key. While we agree that such an expression would be
desirable, we believe that useful statements about the
security of αη can be made even without this expression.
For example, consider a user who deploys an αη sys-
tem with the parameters in the simulation above. She
may specify a security requirement to meet the needs of
her application. For example, she may require that the
eavesdropper’s entropy on the key must be more than
5 bits under a ciphertext-only attack. For this system
under this requirement, it is clear from Fig. 1 that the
system is insecure (i.e. does not meet the requirement)
for message lengths above 8 bits. This is a well-quantified
statement. It is also clear that she could accurately make
this statement based on the estimate (3).
Requiring a limit on Eve’s entropy as we do above is a
common measure of information-theoretic security. For
example, in quantum key distribution experiments, a typ-
ical requirement is for Eve’s expected information on the
key to be less than 10−6 bits for a secret key of hundreds
of bits [3]. The authors of the Comment seem to make the
implicit assumption that all security requirements will be
stated in the form of a maximum probability that Eve will
assign to the correct key. However, even when limited to
this sort of security requirement, statements about the
security can still be made.
We note that PE(K) ≥ 2−HE(K). Therefore, knowl-
edge of HE(K) can be used to show that a maximum
bound on PE(K) is violated, though it is not sufficient to
determine that the bound is obeyed. For example, con-
sider an αη system with the parameters above, with a
security requirement of PE(K) < 2−5. As seen in Fig. 1,
the user could accurately determine from the estimate of
HE(K) that the system would not meet the requirement
for message lengths of 9 or more bits. In fact, the system
would also be insecure for message lengths of 7 or 8 bits,
so she could not use the estimate to find the region of
security, but she could determine some message lengths
as insecure.
If the security requirement of the user involves an en-
tropy of order one bit or less, or a probability of order
one, then the transition will be outside the domain of
our estimate (3). In principle, therefore, we would re-
quire additional analysis to meet the needs of all users.
In practice, however, user requirements tend to be much
more stringent. For example, the experiments in [3] typ-
ically sacrifice about half the bits for additional privacy
amplification so that Eve’s knowledge of a fraction of or-
der one bits of the secret key is reduced to the previously
mentioned 10−6 bits of information on hundreds of bits
of secret key. Thus, for αη, we might expect typical user
requirements to be from a few tens to a few hundreds of
bits of entropy on the key. In this region, the estimate
(3) will be quite accurate, and should be adequate to find
the maximum secure message length.
Another instance where our views on security require-
ments differ from those of the Comment’s authors can be
seen by considering the implications of the limit (4). This
equation guarantees that for any security requirement
with a non-zero key entropy (or a maximum key proba-
bility less than one), there exists a message length such
that the system will be insecure under a ciphertext-only
attack. This was stated more informally in the Letter as
“. . . Eve may have enough information to determine the
key with high probability when Q n0.” The Comment
claims that these statements are “unfalsifiable” and “do
not satisfy the requirement of being a scientific claim.”
However, even in the absence of an analysis such as that
given by Figure 1, we believe that our statements are
not trivial. In the Letter, we provide a counter-example:
the simple additive streaming cipher. For this cipher,
HE(K) = L for all values of Q under the ciphertext-only
attack. Thus there exists no Q such that Eve may deter-
mine the key with high probability (where “high” may be
chosen by the user to have any value above 2−L). By dis-
proving our statement for another cipher, we prove that
the statement itself is falsifiable.
In contrast, the authors of the Comment compare the
additive stream cipher to αη by claiming that “Intu-
itively, the measurement noise in αη would make it more
secure than an additive stream cipher instead of worse
as claimed in [the Letter] at least for the case of known-
plaintext attacks where H(Xn) = 0.” This intuition rests
on a particular selection of security requirement contrary
to the ones we have discussed above: that is, HE(K) = 0.
While, technically speaking, the user may choose any se-
curity requirement, we again note that in practice users
generally have more stringent requirements. For exam-
ple, we do not know of any application in which the eaves-
dropper may know the key with confidence 0.99 and yet
the system is considered secure.
This approach to security is perhaps related to the
choice in the Comment to focus on the quantity N¯k, the
number of false seed keys to which Eve assigns a non-
zero probability. As the Comment points out, the tail
of the gaussian noise distribution does not reach zero
at any point on the circle. Eve’s seed key probabilities
are the product of the conditional probabilities of the
measurements. The conditional probabilities are all non-
zero. Any product of a finite number of non-zero num-
bers is also non-zero. Hence for any finite Q, Eve will
assign a non-zero probability to each seed key. Therefore
N¯k = 2L − 1 for all finite Q (though limQ→∞ N¯k = 0).
Though we agree with this analysis, we do not be-
lieve it is relevant to users in practice. If it were, the
user could make the gaussian noise σ arbitrarily small
(say, σ = 10−10). The eavesdropper would correctly de-
termine each running key and message bit transmitted,
with a probability close to one, but could never drive the
entropy exactly to zero, or completely rule out the highly
improbable messages and keys. But in this case the user
4could achieve the same result by simply transmitting the
plaintext over a channel with an arbitrarily small (but
non-zero) bit error rate. Since in practice no channel has
a bit error rate which is precisely zero, we believe that
if this were the only security requirement the user had,
then any real channel would suffice without the need for
an encryption system such as αη.
We close by responding to another criticism of our
Letter. The authors of the Comment also hold that
“there is no commonly agreed meaning of the symbols
‘≈’ and ‘’” and therefore our estimate (3) “is not well-
defined. . . it cannot be falsified, the possibility of the lat-
ter being the hallmark of a meaningful scientific state-
ment” (emphasis in original). While we believe that ex-
act equalities are preferable to approximations, we do
not agree that all use of approximation is unscientific.
For example, we feel no qualms about statements such
as
tan(x) ≈ x for x 1, (7)
which was also used in the Letter, without argument from
the authors of the Comment, or
(2H(K) − 1)2−nD ≈ 2H(K)−nD for 2H(K)  1, (8)
which was used in the Comment itself (though, to be fair,
they used “ .=” instead of “≈”, and did not specify the
assumption used in the approximation).
In conclusion, we do not find that the Comment re-
futes the claims of our Letter. We have performed addi-
tional simulations which show that our estimates of the
eavesdropper’s entropy are quite accurate in the specified
domain. We also find that some of the additional claims
made in the Comment, while technically true, are not
relevant in practice to users of the αη system.
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